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iiiAbstract
After discussing the evolution  of the policy dialogue in Hungary, the paper broadly  describes the
reform of the pay-as-you-go  public pension system and its partial privatization  as legislated in
July 1997. Through a combination  of a debt and tax financed  transition, the first partial pension
privatization in Central Europe is shown  to generate increased  national savings while placing the
pension system on a more sustainable course. The potential  positive impact  on savings was
diminished by politically-motivated  compromises. Outstanding  issues include problematic
features of the "second pillar" and the reemergence  of pay-as-you-go  deficits in the long run.
This suggests that further reforms, such as raising the retirement age beyond 62, will eventually
be required.
ivAI.  Introduction
The Hungarian public pension system is a defined benefit scheme financed on a pay-as-
you-go (PAYG)  basis that has reached a high degree of maturation. Like PAYG schemes in many
aging countries,  the Hungarian  pension system is characterized  by high system dependency  ratios,
large expenditures  relative  to GDP,  high contribution  rates, and a precarious financial  situation. In
addition to the inevitable impact of demographic aging, the deterioration of pension finances in
Hungary  is also strongly related to policies prevailing under the socialist regime, such as a  low
retirement  age, and to certain strategies  followed during  the transition  to a market economy,  such as
the liberal  use  of disability  pensions  to ease transitional  unemployment.
Despite  very high  payroll  taxes and reductions  in the average pension through manipulation
of various indexation parameters. earmarked revenues have not covered expenditures in recent
years. Expenditure  pressures  will intensify  after the tum of the century, when dependency  ratios are
projected  to increase significantly. Meanwhile, the scope for keeping these expenditures under
control  through  ad-hoc adjustments  to indexation  parameters  is narrowing. Explosive  deficits could
come sooner, if the high payroll tax rates and the diminishing  confidence in the public PAYG
scheme  continue  to drive  economic  activity into the informal  sector,  further eroding  the tax base. A
shrinking tax  base  and  growing pension expenditures would result  in  either  larger General
Govemment deficits or higher payroll taxes.  Neither outcome would be acceptable, given the
Govemment's efforts to correct the large fiscal disequilibria  of the early  1990s (7-8 percent to
GDP), and to reduce the extremely  high payroll  tax rates, which constitute more than 40 percent of
labor  costs,  defined as gross wages  plus employer  contributions.
The challenge for Hungary is to design and implement a  pension reform capable of
restoring long-run  financial viability and reducing economic  distortions while protecting  the most
vulnerable  groups during the transition. In May 1996,  the Hungarian Govemment announced its
intention to take on this challenge by  introducing  a multipillar system in Hungary.  The draft
legislation  was submitted to Parliament  in May 1997,  after one year of intense technical  work anddiscussions  with  the major  social partners. The law was passed by Parliament  in July 1997 and full
implementation  will begin during the first half of 1998.  With this timetable,  Hungary will be the
first former socialist  country  to implement  such a systemic change.
This paper examines  the recent evolution  of the Hungarian pension  system and the reforrn
proposal passed by the Hungarian Parliament  in the summer of 1997.  The paper is structured as
follows:  The next  section  identifies the problems  of the current PAYG system  and presents long-run
deficit projections in the absence  of reform.  The third section briefly examines the  policy
discussion surrounding  the reform effort.  The fourth section describes the reforrm  program and
presents an assessment  of its medium and long-run  economic impact.  The fifth section concludes
and identifies  preliminary  lessons for other  transforming  socialist  countries.
II.  Performance of the Pension  System in the Post  War Period
The Maturation of the PAYG System
Hungary's PAYG system  matured  rapidly during  the  post-war period,  as  coverage
expanded  and the retirement  age was reduced  from its pre-war levels of 65/60  to 60/55 for men and
women, respectively. 1 Table  I  shows this maturation as reflected in the rapid increase of the
system dependency ratio (the ratio of  pensioners to  workers), which surpassed the  old age
dependency  ratio (the ratio of persons aged 60 and above to those aged 20-59) in the mid-1970s.
The growing  difference  between the two ratios was partly due to the low retirement  age of women,
who comprised an increasing  proportion of the pensioner population,  and whose life expectancy  at
retirement  rose from  20 to 23 years over  the last three decades. Benefit levels  also rose, driven both
2by  longer  average contribution  periods,  as well  as  more  generous  benefits and  more  permissive
eligibility rules.  These developments,  typical of PAYG schemes around the world, led to a steadily
increasing ratio of pension spending to GDP (Figure 1).
Table  1
Maturation  of the Hungarian  Pension  System,  1950-1995
Ratio of  Ratio of  Ratio of  Ratio of
Pensioners  Pensioners  to Pension  Persons aged 60+  Average Pension  to
Year  to Employed  Age Population <'  to those aged  20-59  Average Net Wage
(in %)  (in %)  (in %)  (in %)
1950  12.9  39  21.2  21.5
1955  - 38  - 24.9
1960  15.2  43  25.9  32.4
1965  - 59  - 32.3
1970  26.4  56  32.2  34.4
1975  - 71  - 42.2
1980  35.8  83  30.6  55.5
1985  40.8  93  - 56.2
1990  46.1  105  35.9  66.1
1995  74.8  130  36.0  61.0
Notes: 1/  Pension  age population refers to women over age 55 and men over  60.
Sources: Bod (1995); Pension  Insurance  Fund (1996); Mitchell (1992).
According to Szalai (1991), the retirement age was reduced in 1944 but the war ended  before the change
took effect. However,  the new Social Security Act retained the lower age limits.
3It is difficult to assess the balance of the pension system during the post war period, as
payroll tax revenues financed both pension and health expenditures,  without any clear distinction
between  the two classes of expenditures  within the overall  social insurance budget. In the first two
decades  after the war there were years when revenues exceeded  expenditures,  even though  payroll
taxes were lower at that time. Between  1970s  and 1983,  payroll tax revenues  were not sufficient  to
cover outlays on both health and pensions (Figure 1), suggesting that the PAYG system started
experiencing  deficits during that period.  Payroll taxes were increased  in the latter  half of the 1980s
allowing  the social insurance  budget  to generate a surplus equivalent  to 1 percent of GDP in 1989.
Deficits returned in the early 1990s,  however, as the pressures on the PAYG system increased
again,  with the start of Hungary's economic  transformation.
Figure  1: Payroll Tax Revenue vs. Pension  and
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4Pension Finances  during  the Transition  to a Market  Economy
As in many former socialist countries, pressure  on Hungarian pension finances took the
form of a dramatic  increase  in the system dependency  ratio between 1991 and 1995. This increase
occurred despite a temporary  pause in the demographic  aging process, as indicated  by the stability
of the old age dependency  ratio between 1990 and 1995 (Table 1). By  1995, the relationship
between  the old age dependency  ratio and the system  dependency  ratio was among the most skewed
in the world (Figure  2). Therefore,  recent pressures  on the pension system  are not directly  related to
population aging,  but to policies  prevailing during  Hungary's  transition  towards  a market  economy.
Figure  2 System  vs Old Age Dependency  Ratio,
Hungary  vs Selected  Countries
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Sources: World Bank (1994);  Pension Insurance  Fund  (1996).
Specifically,  the increase  in the system  dependency  ratio was due to: (i) a reduction  in labor
force participation  (which fell from 85 to 76 percent between 1990 and  1994), (ii) increased
unemployment  (which rose from nearly zero in 1990  to around 10 percent in 1994), and (iii) anincrease in the rate of new early retirement  and disability claims;  The abuse of the disability
system  was of particular importance,  because  it affected both the numerator and the denominator  in
the ratio.  From  1985 to  1990, the rate of new disability claims in the non-agricultural  sector
averaged approximately 85 per  ten thousand covered workers, whereas in  1995 this ratio had
jumped to 160.
The exact impact  of these shocks  to the finances of the PAYG system is difficult to assess,
despite the separation of the Pension and Health Insurance Funds (PIF and HIF, respectively)  in
1992. This difficulty is due to the shift of certain pension spending  outside the PIF budget (e.g.,
disability pensions for younger workers were shifted to the HIF and agricultural pensions were
shifted to the State budget), a convoluted  web of transfers between  the central budget,  the FHF  and
the PIF, and certain special  revenue items in the PIF budget. The PIF itself has experienced  deficits
of around  0.3 percent of GDP since its creation  despite charging  payroll tax rates of 30.5 percent on
gross wages. 3
The overall deficit of the PAYG pension system (defined as the difference  between all
pension expenditures and contribution revenues) is significantly larger.  As shown in Table 2,
covering  all pension expenditures in 1992  (including under-age disability pensions and agriculture
pensions)  would  have required  a notional  contribution  rate of 35.5 percent, or roughly 5 percentage
points higher than the rate charged by the PIF. However, the revenues generated from this high
notional contribution rate  would have fallen short  of  covering total  pension expenditures by
approximately  1.5  percent of GDP between  1994  and 1996.
2  See  OECD  (1995)  for  a discussion  of special  early  retirement  programs  between  1990  and 1993.
The  total  tax on gross  wages  for  health  and  pensions  was 54 percent  for most  of the period. When  the PIF
and the HIF were established,  the 54 percent  rate was split in two parts--a rate of 30.5 (24.5/6
employer/employee)  percent  to finance  the PIF  and a rate of 23.5 percent  (19.5/4  employer/employee)  to
finance  the HIF.  Adding  the contributions  to  unemployment  insurance  payroll  taxes  represented  60  percent  of
the gross  wage  or more  than  40 percent  of labor  costs,  defined  as gross  wage  plus employer  contributions--
among  the  highest  in the  world.
6Table 2  Public  Pension  Finances in Hungary during the Transition
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Percentage of GDP
Contribution  Revenues  '  11.0%  10.4%  10.1%  9.7%  8.9%  8.5%
of which PIF budget  n.a.  8.9%  8.7%  8.3%  7.6%  7.3%
Pension  Spending2  10.5%  10.4%  10.4%  11.4%  10.5%  9.7%
of which, PIF budget  n.a.  8.6%  8.5%  8.8%  8.0%  7.4%
of which,  HIF budget  n.a.  1.2%  1.3%  1.3%  1.2%  1.2%
of which,  Central  budget  n.a.  0.6%  0.6%  1.3%  1.3%  1.1%
Notional  Pay-as-you-go  balance  0.5%  0.0%  -0.3%  -1.7%  -1.6%  -1.2%
Notes:
1/ Payroll tax considered  here is 35.5%  which is the rate required  to generate contribution revenues sufficient  to
cover all pension spending in 1992. Intragovemmental transfers on behalf of the unemployed and soldiers are
ignored as are payments of penalties etc. The overall payroll tax for health and pensions was 53% in 1990/1991.
This was raised to 54% (44% employer!  10% employee) in April of 1992.
2! Expenditures do not include administrative  costs.  0
0  The  financial  performance  of  Hungarv's  pension  system  can  be  examined  further  by
decomposing  the ratios of revenues and  expenditures to GDP into several  components as shown  in
equations (1) and (2):
(I)  Revenues  =  *  Covered  Wage  Bill  *  Wage  Bill  *  Labor  Income
GDP  Wage  Bill  Labor  Income  GDP
(2)  Expenditures  =  Pensioners  *  Average  Pension  *  Real  Average  Gross  Wage  *  Employment
GDP  Employed  Average  Gross  Wage  Real  GDP
In  equation  (1), a  is the  notional  contribution  rate that  would  have balanced  all  pension
expenditures  and contribution revenues  in  1992, the year  when the  PIF was created. The covered
wage bill  is the share of the wage bill which is effectively captured to finance pension expenditures,
whereas labor income is defined as the wage bill, social security contributions paid by the  employer,
and  the  labor share of mixed income  (mostly self-employed  individuals),  all taken from  national
accounts data.  GDP is measured at market prices.  Equation (1) highlights the major components  of
7the base of the payroll tax, and thus enables  the identification  of the possible sources of erosion  of
the tax base.
Equation  (2) enables the examination  of the evolution of pension expenditures,  relative to
the size of the economy.  Thus, for instance,  an increase in the ratio of pensioners to employed
workers (the system dependency  ratio) increases  the ratio of pension expenditures  to GDP, but this
effect can be offset by a commensurate  decrease in the ratio of employed workers to real GDP (an
increase in labor productivity). Likewise,  an increase in the ratio of the average pension to the
average gross  wage (a measure of the average  replacement ratio) increases the ratio of pensions  to
GDP, but that can be offset by a reduction  in the real average gross wage.  Note that the average
gross wage was constructed dividing the total wage bill by total employment, whereas the real
average gross wage was constructed  dividing  the average gross wage by the GDP deflator. These
two variables close the accounting identity in (2), although they differ from the more familiar
average  wage  reported by the Central Statistical  Office (CSO).
The components  of the two accounting  identities (I) and (2) were estimated for the 1991-96
period, which is the period for which consistent national accounts data were available. Total
revenues  were calculated  using a contribution  rate of 35.5 percent,  which is the rate that would  have
balanced  the PAYG system in 1992  (Table  2).  Total expenditures  include pension spending  by the
PIF, the HIF and the State budget.  This construction provides a comprehensive  view of pension
revenues and expenditures at  all levels of Govemment, and makes it possible to compare a
consistent  definition  of pension spending  through  time.
The results,  shown in  Tables 3.a and  3.b,  reveal several interesting trends.  First,
contribution  revenues declined significantly  as a share of GDP between 1991 and 1996. Table 3.a
shows  that  this decline  cannot be attributed  only to problems in collecting  contributions  from formal
sector employees,  as the ratio of the covered  wage bill to the wage bill was rather stable during  the
4 The  covered  wage  bill  was  estimated  from  information  on contribution  revenues  and  the contribution  rate.
This  variable  is estimated  assuming  that  the  labor  share  of mixed  income  is equal  to the labor  share  of GDP
excluding  mixed  income.
8first half of the 1990s  (until  the decline in 1996). The absolute level of this indicator  does, however,
signal persistent problems  with the contribution base, given that approximately  one fourth of the
wage bill seems to be untouched  by the payroll tax.  Most of the untaxed wage bill was due to
arrears, exemptions  of certain non-monetary  forms of compensation and specific types of income,
as well as the taxable earnings  ceiling on employee  contributions.
The second  component  is a rough proxy for the proportion of total labor  income generated
by employees of private firms in the formal sector and public sector employees. This ratio has
fallen steadily, as shown  in Table 3.a.  The decline in the formal sector wage bill relative to total
labor income can be largely explained by a  shift of many workers to self-employment  status,
motivated  in good part by attempts  to minimize  tax liabilities. While self-employed  workers have to
pay payroll taxes just like  other  workers, they also  tend to underreport  their income.
Table 3a Decomposition  of Pension  Revenues  in Hungary  during  the Transition
Percentage  of GDP
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1996/91
Contribution  Revenues/GDP  11.0%  10.4%  10.1%  9.7%  8.9%  8.4%  76.2%
Covered  Wage  Bill/Wage  Bill  75.6%  75.2%  75.3%  77.0%  78.0%  73.1%  96.7%
Wage Bill  / Total Labor  Income  66.5%  63.2%  61.9%  62.2%  58.2%  58.3%  87.6%
Total  Labor  Income  / GDP  61.4%  61.8%  60.9%  57.1%  55.1%  55.3%  90.1%
Payroll  tax rate considered  35.5%  35.5%  35.5%  35.5%  35.5%  35.5%
Memo:
Wage Bill/GDP  40.8%  39.1%  37.7%  35.5%  32.1%  32.2%
Covered  Wage Bill  / GDP  30.9%  29.4%  28.4%  27.3%  25.1%  23.5%  . 76.2%
Table 3  a also shows  that  the revenue  decline  was due to the overall contraction  of the labor
share of GDP which fell from 61.4 to 56.7 percent of GDP over the period.  This decline was in
good part due to falling labor  force participation  rates, which in turn was the product  of increasing
student  enrollment  ratios, disability,  early retirement and fewer working  pensioners. Another factor
was unemployment which rose from a rate of 0.3 to 14 percent between 1990 and 1993 before
9leveling  off  at  10 percent  in  1995.6  In  addition, the  sharp  decline  in  1995 was  largely  due to
restrictive wage policies  introduced  by the Government  in the March  1995 stabilization  prograrn--
real average wages fell by more than  10 percent during that year.
0
This steady decline  in revenues was not matched  by a similar fall on the expenditure  side,
however.  The relative stability  of the expenditure ratio  was due  neither to favorable  demographic
pattems  nor to reforms of the pension  system.  On the contrary, despite favorable demographics,  the
system dependency ratio  was allowed to increase precipitously  during the  period,  as proposals  to
raise  the retirement  age  and  tighten  disability  requirements  were  largely  ignored.  As  shown  in
Table  3.b, the jump  in the  system  dependency  ratio  would  have  increased  the  ratio  of  pension
expenditures to GDP by nearly  60 percent  between 1991 and  1996, had  it not been  offset by other
factors. This offset did occur however,  as indicated by the decline  in the replacement  ratio, and in
the ratio of employment to real GDP (i.e., the increase in labor productivity).  During  1995, the real
average wage also declined sharply, contributing to the decline  in the ratio of expenditures  to GDP.
0
Table  3b Decomposition  of Public Pension  Expenditures  in Hungary  during
the Transition
Percentage  of GDP
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1996/91
Pension  Expenditures  I GDP  10.5%  10.4%  10.4%  11.4%  10.5%  9.7%  92.3%
System Dependency  Ratio  49.5%  58.5%  66.7%  71.8%  74.8%  78.1%  157.8%
Replacement Ratio (SNA)  52.2%  45.5%  41.3%  44.8%  43.7%  37.9%  72.7%
Wage Bill  / GDP  40.8%  39.1%  37.7%  35.5%  32.1%  32.9%  80.5%
Breakdown  of Wage  BilGDP:X
Real Average Wages  191.8  196.7  207.6  211.5  199.6  209.5  109.2%
Employment / Real GDP  2.13  1.99  1.82  1.68  1.61  1.57  73.7%
Memo:
Replacement  Ratio (CSO)  64.4%  58.0%  57.4%  60.8%  61.0%  57.9%  89.8%
6  The growth of the informal sector during this period  (estimated to have reached 30 percent of GDP) may
have also reduced total measured GDP and the labor  share, as informnal  activities  tend to have a high labor
component.
10The reduction in the average replacement ratio  was largely due to the manipulation  of three
key  indexation  parameters  in  the  determination  of  pension  benefits.  First,  the  lack  of  full
actualization  of  past  wage  history  in the  benefit  formula  resulted  in  an  erosion  of  real  entry
pensions.7 Second, the brackets or bend points in the redistributive  benefit formula  were not fully
adjusted  for wage  growth,  leading  to  a "reverse  bracket  creeping"  effect.  These  two  factors
resulted  in a sharp drop  of entry  level pensions, both  in real terms  and  in relation  to the  average
wage in the economy.  Third, less than full indexation of pensions to gross wages also contributed to
the  reduction in the  ratio  of the  average pension to the  average gross wage.  During  this  period,
pensions  were  indexed  to  movements  in the  expected  net  average  wage  during  the  upcoming
calendar year.  As it happened, the  average pension failed to fully adjust to changes  in net wages,
ex-post, and fell even more relative to gross wages during the same period, because of the  increase
in average personal income tax rates.
The decline  in  the  ratio  of  employment to  real  GDP  also  helped  stabilize  the  pension
spending ratio, as shown  in Table 3.b.  From another angle, although the system dependency  ratio
increased by more than  50 percent  between  1991 and  1996, the  impact  of  such  an  increase was
partly  mitigated  by  the  35  percent  gain in  labor productivity  (real  GDP  per  employed  worker)
during  the  same period.  Finally,  although the  increase  in the  real  average  gross  wage  exerted
upward  pressure  on  the  spending  ratio  in  some  years,  its  sharp  drop  in  1995  contributed
significantly to its decline in that year.
The fundamental  role played by the manipulation  of indexation parameters  in maintaining
the  balance of the pension  system  is an important finding.  It reveals the system's  dependence  on
high rates of inflation and ad hoc  opaque indexation rules  which  have been perceived  as arbitrary
and unfair by the Hungarian  public.8 Whereas the scope for continued  manipulation  of indexation
parameters  in  this  opaque  fashion  seems  to  be  narrowing,  further  sharp  increases  in  labor
productivity  are also  unlikely,  as  most  of the  shedding  of  excess labor has  already  taken place.
7  The annual  wage history since 1988  is taken into  account for the determination  of new pensions,  but wages
are only revalued  to take into account  wage growth  up until two years before  retirement. Interestingly,  this
also seems  to be the practice in the United States.
11Therefore,  in order to control expenditures,  the Government  needed to introduce  more fundamental
reforms  to the pension system.
The  Future of the PAYG  Scheme  in the Absence of Reforms
As mentioned before, pension finances deteriorated  significantly during the early 1990s,
despite favorable demographic developments.  Along with the  rest  of  Europe, Hungary will
experience  rapid population aging in the next few decades,  putting further stress on the PAYG
system. Under current policies, this demographic pressure will lead to a situation in which one
worker  will have to support  one pensioner  by the year 2035. Therefore, it is essential  to assess the
potential  impact of such a deterioration  in fundamentals  on the finances of the Hungarian pension
system. This assessment  was made through the use of an actuarial  model developed  as part of the
reform  (described  in more detail in Appendix 1).
The main economic  and demographic assumptions  underlying  the actuarial  projections are
shown  in Table 4.  Official  Government  projections  of the main economic variables  are used for the
first three years (1997-99). After 1999, GDP and wage growth are consistent with convergence
with Austrian per capita income levels around 2030, assuming  Austrian real GDP growth rates of
approximately  1.5 percent p.a..9  Real wages are projected to  grow in  line with increases in
productivity,  implying  a stable  labor share in GDP, and real wages  growing slightly  faster than GDP
(due  to the projected decline in the working age population). Inflation is assumed to drop rapidly
and  then to stabilize at about 3 percent p.a. after the year 2000,  reflecting convergence  with Western
European  rates of inflation.  The unemployment rate is assumed to  fall very gradually and to
stabilize  at around 6 percent by the end of the projection  period. While the baseline demographic
projections  (elaborated  by Hablicsek  (1995)) imply a significant  increase in the old age dependency
ratio, the actual number of contributors  to the pension system is determined by demographics as
well as labor force participation  rates. The latter are assumed  to remain roughly constant  after 1995
given that an exogenous recovery in formal sector participation  rates is rather improbable in the
For  a description  of these  arbitrary  effects,  see Kalmanne  et. al.,  (1996)  and Simonovits  (1997).
12absence  of  a  well-designed  package  of  reforms  (including,  inter  alia,  a  higher  retirement  age,
disability reform, lower payroll taxes).
Table  4 Summary of Economic  and  Demographic  Assumptions  for
Baseline  Pension Projections,  Hungary 1997-2050
Period  1997-1999  2000-2030  2031-2050
Average Annual Rates (in  o), Unless Otherwise Indicated
Economic  Assumptionsl
Real GDP Growth  3.5  3.6  2.6
Real Wage Growth  3.3  4.0  3.3
Inflation Rate  13.8  3.0  2.5
Unemployment  Rate  10.4  7.6  6.9
Demographic  Assumptions
Population Growth  -0.23  -0.31  -0.41
o/w Working Age (20-59)  0.09  -0.47  -0.84
o/w over 60  -0.22  0.58  0.77
Labor Force Growth  -0.06  -0.44  -0.81
Growth of Pensioner Population  0.32  0.25  0.31
Life Expectancy (men)2 64.9  69.2  74.5
Life Expectancy (women)2 74.9  77.6  82.5
1\ Official  Goverunent Projections  through 1999
2\ Years at birth
Projected  pension  expenditures  include  old  age,  disability  and  survivors  pensions.lO
Projected  revenues  include  contributions  from  employed  workers  (the  sum  of  employer  and
employee contributions),  and those made  by the Government  on behalf of the  unemployed,  while
excluding  late payments, collection of arrears and other non-recurrent  items.  The base year is 1995
and the model is calibrated to exactly match actual expenditures  in 1996.  Furthermore,  the baseline
contribution  rate  used  in the  projections  - 35.5  percent,  is chosen  in such  a  way  as to  generate
contribution  revenues sufficient to cover  1996 expenditures as defined here.
Under these demographic  and  economic assumptions,  and  in the absence  of reforms,  the
Hungarian  PAYG  system would generate  growing deficits,  as  show-n in Figure  3.a.  The deficits
The GDP growth rates in Table 4 are lower than those experienced by Hungary between 1950 and 1989
when growth averaged  more than 4 percent p.a. (Augustinovics  1993).
13would increase  to around 2 percent by the end of next decade,  and would be close to 6 percent of
GDP in 2050,  the end of the projection  period.  This result is essentially  due to the assumption  of a
declining  rate of inflation, and to adverse demographic  trends. The decline in the rate of inflation
assumed  for the 1997-2005  period implies increasing real average  pension benefits  because of the
backward indexation rule, and also increasing real entry pension benefits, because of the smaller
inflation-related  losses built into the benefit formula. The decline  in inflation dominates  the results
in this first period -- if inflation  remained constant at the 1996 levels, the deficit in 2005 would be
around  I percent of GDP lower  than projected.
Whereas  the decline  in inflation and consequent  increase  in expenditures  is the mror cause
of the  early deficits,  demographic factors  dominate the  results after  2005.  The projected
fluctuations  in the deficits as a share of GDP closely mirror the old age and system dependency
ratios,  as shown  in Figure 3.b. Both ratios increase between  2005 and 2017, followed  by a ten year
period of stability, followed by another increase. The dramatic  increase in the old age dependency
ratio is from about 35 to 65 percent,  while pensioners eventually  outnumber contributors  by about
20 percent. Note that the pension deficits would probably be larger  than those presented in Figure
3.a.,  as the simulations  assume that there would be no further erosion  of the payroll tax base, either
via outriaht  infornality or underreporting  of earnings.
'° Expenditures  exclude  items  covered  under  the central  budget  and  administrative  costs.  Including
administrative  costs  would  add 1-2  percent  to total  expenditures.
14Figure 3a  Deficits in the Public Pension Scheme
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15These pension  deficits could be  avoided by raising contribution rates or reducing benefits.
In order to illustrate,  Figure  3.b  shows how  these  indicators would have  to  change  if the  system
were to be balanced.  Clearly the type of contribution  rates shown here would  trigger even greater
labor market  distortions  than  already  exist,  and  such  a  proposal  would  be  antithetical  to  the
Government's  current  intentions to reduce  labor costs.  At the  same time,  the  massive cuts  in the
average replacement  rate required to balance the system could not be achieved without social unrest
and increased poverty.  In short, Figure 3a and 3b suggest that the system would  either fail to keep
current pension  promises  or  would  do  great  harm to  Hungary's  economic  performance. 1 1 The
absence  of  reforms  would  also  imply  a  massive  burden  on  future  generations,  irrespective  of
whether the future imbalances  were financed  by higher  contributions, lower replacement  ratios, or
general taxes.
'l  It is very unlikely that private savings would increase so as to offset the increase in pension deficits. On
the contrary,  private savings could actually decline in the long-run, due also to the aging of the population.
See Auerbach et al (1989) for an analysis of four OECD countries, and Borsch-Supan (1985) for an
analysis  of the German case.
16Figure 3c Payroll Tax or Replacement Rate
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m.  The Quest  for Pension  Reform  in Hungary
The  pressures  on  expenditures  resulting  from  Hungary's  economic  transformation,  the
problems in revenue collection caused by excessive contribution rates, and the awareness of adverse
demographic  trends,  led to a progressive  recognition that the  pension  system had to be reformed.
Reaching  agreement  on the  best  strategy  for reformn  has  proven  difficult,  however.  There  was
consensus  among  different  agencies  and  scholars on  some  important  issues such  as the  need  to
increase the retirement age, to tighten eligibility criteria (particularly  for disability pensions),  and to
reduce contribution rates, but there was little agreement on anything else.
The most controversial and debated issue was whether  the pension reform should focus  on
improving  the  PAYG,  combined  with  tax  incentives for the  voluntary,  third  pillar,  or  whether
1.7Hungary should also make an effort to introduce a mandatory  second pillar.  Other  issues included
the  degree of income  redistribution  inside the  pension  system,  and  the  system  of indexation  of
pensions in progress.  The debate  frequently became  populist, plagued by appeals  for Hungary to
avoid  schemes that destroyed  solidarity among  generations,  and to adopt  an "European  model",
revealing a lack of knowledge  or recognition of the variety of pension systems in Europe, especially
the existence of large funded systems in a number of countries such as Switzerland, the Netherlands,
Denmark, Ireland. and the UK.
The debate proceeded  until the  spring of  1996, when the  Government  finally  decided to
move ahead with a comprehensive pension reform, combining several changes  in the PAYG and the
introduction  of a  mandatory,  fully-funded  second  pillar.  This decision  was  reflected  in  a joint
proposal of the Ministry of Welfare and the Ministry  of Finance, outlining the  main elements of the
reform,  and was presented  to  the Hungarian  Parliament  in the  summer  of  1996.  The proposal
indicated a program of preparatory  technical work, and the creation of a 30-member  working group
to carry it out.  The proposal  also included a timetable  of legislative work,  whereby  the new law
would be submitted to Parliament  by the end of the year, with expectation of adoption by Parliament
a few months  later.  The Parliament  endorsed the main  elements of the proposal,  while  requesting
more details before the submission of final draft legislation.
The factors that  led the Govemment  to commit to amultipillar  system  in mid 1996 are not
entirely clear.  Trade  unions  seemed  divided or  undecided,  and  the  general  public  followed the
debate  at  a  certain  distance.  The  non-profit  pension  funds  in  the  incipient  third  pillar  were
ambivalent.  Clearly, some  govemment officials and Parliamentarians  realized the growing crisis of
credibility faced by the PAYG  scheme and considered the multipillar solution as the one most likely
to  produce  permanent  results.  According  to  several  Hungarian  policymakers,  the  individual
measures required  to keep  pension  finances  under control  - such as  changing  indexation - were
more  palatable  in the  context  of  a  fundamental  reform  package.  This  view  stemmed  from  an
12  The paper adopts the terminology  proposed  by the World Bank (Averting  the Old Age Crisis, 1994),
whereby the first pillar refers to a PAYG, publicly-managed  pillar, the second pillar is mandatory. fully-
funded,  and privately-managed,  and the third pillar is voluntary,  also fully-fumded  and privately-managed.
18awareness of the public's  growing frustration with the kind of temporary, ad hoc adjustments which
had been used in recent years.
The draft legislation was submitted to Parliament  in May of 1997, more than one year after
the decision had been reached and  six months  later than  the original target  deadline.  Throughout
this  period, the Pension  Insurance  Fund (PIF)  remained  opposed, attacking  the  reforrm in public
debates with officials of the Ministries of Finance and  Welfare and frequent  interviews in the press.
The PIF argued that the proposed changes to the PAYG  would hurt pensioners  and that the private
component  of  the  multipillar  scheme  would  be  too  risky.  Another  concern,  shared  by  some
members  of  Parliament,  was  the  possible  adverse  economic  impact  of  the  so-called  transition
deficit, the deficit caused by the loss of revenues to the second pillar.
During the last quarter of 1996 and the first few months of 1997, a series of public meetings
were  held with trade unions, employer representatives,  pensioners, academics,  students, and many
smaller  groups (for example,  one  group represented  families  with many  children)  to discuss  the
pension reform. These debates seemed to have increased the general public's  awareness of pension
issues and the prospects of a systemic reform.  According  to one survey (TARKI  1997), more than
sixty percent of the public  had  some information  on the  pension reform  in November  1996.  The
same survey found that  younger,  educated Hungarians  were  more likely  to  favor the multipillar
system while persons over  60 were  more likely to disapprove  of it.  A  follow-up  survey in May
1997 showed 80 percent were aware of the reform and that the percentage which saw it as a positive
step rose from 38 to 53 percent.
As  a  result  of  these  public  debates,  the  Government  made  some  concessions,  and  the
original draft legislation was modified.  Anticipating the description of the pension  reform (provided
in the next section), the most  important changes to the original proposal  were: 4)  the reduction in
the  contribution  rate to  the  second pillar  from  10 to  8 percentage  points  with  a  commensurate
increase in the size of the remaining first pillar; (ii)  the  delay in the introduction  of the combined
wage/price indexation until 2001; (iii) the increase in the number of service years credited to women
bearing  children; (iv)  the  possibility  for  university  students  to  buy  service  years;  and  (v)  new
19guarantees for the overall replacement  rate which would be received by pensioners in the mixed
system.  Several further modifications were  made after  the  legislation was brought before
Parliament. Most important  amongst them were: (vi) the postponement of the introduction  of the
new benefit formula and taxation regime until 2013, (vii) an increase in widow's benefits for
working  women, (viii) the elimination of age restrictions  with regard to the voluntary  opt-out, and
(ix) and a slight increase  in the value of the guarantee  in the second  pillar.
Although most of the changes above tended to weaken the savings effect of the reform
package, during Parliamentary  debate there  were also a  few  changes which improved fiscal
sustainability. The most important  of these was the modification  to the retirement  age schedule  after
2009, which raised the number  of years needed for early retirement from 33 to 37 and the earliest
age of retirement from 57 to 59.  The fact that the period of Parliamentary  debate did not involve
more dramatic  changes reflects  the fact that most of the compromises had already been made, first
between  the MoW and MoF positions, and later between  the Government and the special interest
groups. 13
The time and effort devoted  to this political process delayed much of the work required to
implement the  system according to the  original target date of January 1, 1998.  By October,
regulatory decrees had been issued and the licensing  of private pension funds had begun.  At the
same  time, an extensive  information  campaign was just getting under way. While  the work  in these
areas  will have to be intense,  the most difficult aspect  of implementation  may be the creation of the
new information technology and infrastructure which are needed to  drive the system.  With
elections  coming in late  Spring,  the Government  will have  to make a special  effort to ensure  that this
historic  reform gets off to a smooth start during  the first quarter of 1998.
The average  age of Parliamentarians  in Hungary  is around  50. The average  age of "yes"  voters  was
approximately  48 compared  to an average  age of 57 for "no"  voters. Available  data  show  that  even after
taking  into account  party  affiliations,  older Parliamentarians  were more likely  to vote against  the reform
than  younger  members.
20IV. The Hungarian  Pension Reform
A4  General  Description
The Government  submitted  a  proposal  to  Parliament  which  would  have  given  workers
under the age of 47 the choice to stay in a reformed PAYG or to switch to a new, multipillar pension
system in 1998.  New entrants  in the labor force would  automatically belong in the mixed system.
After challenges in the Constitutional  Court however, the arbitrary  cutoff line was dropped and the
final legislation allowed all workers the choice to move  to the mixed system.  However,  guarantees
within the new system were  provided only to workers  who participated  in the  second pillar  for at
least  15 years (see below).  The Government's  information  campaign also strongly  advises  older
workers not to switch to the new scheme.
The mixed system  will be  mandatory  for  new  entrants  in the  labor force  as of July  1,
1998.  Workers  who  have  already  acquired  pension  rights  under  the  current  system  (and those
who  enter  the  labor market  through  July  1998)  will  have  the  option to  stay  in the  reformed
PAYG,  or to switch to the  new system.  This choice  will be  available  during the  last quarter  of
1997 and the second pillar  will begin to receive  contributions  in January  1998.  Workers  will be
given  two  years  to exercise  their  right  to  switch  to  the  new  system--until  August  31,  1999.
Workers  who initially  opt for the new system will be  able to return to the  reformed  PAYG until
September  2000.  After that  date, workers will be permanently  affiliated  either with the reformed
PAYG  or with the new system. 14
The reformed PAYG  ("modemized"  PAYG,  in the  Hungarian jargon)  would  include  a
higher  normal  retirement  age  of  62  for both  men  and  women,  changes  in  the  benefit  formula
designed to gradually eliminate  some of the redistributive  elements in the formula, a new tax regime
and  a shift from net wage  indexation  to a combination  price/wage indexation formula  (50 percent
4  The decision  to switch to the mixed system  could be exercised  beginning in September  1997 and by the
time of writing  several thousand people had already done so. The first contributions  to the second pillar
will only begin to flow however, in January 1998.
21net wages, 50 percent consumer  prices). The new legislation  includes detailed transition  tables for
the retirement age increase  and corresponding  early retirement penalties and a new set of accrual
rates which apply to  gross rather than net wage history.  The retirement age begins to  rise
immediately  but only  reaches its new final state in the year 2009. The new indexation  mechanism  is
fully implemented  by 2001 while the new benefit formula and tax regime is in place by 2013. The
minimum pension would be indexed in the  same way as other pensions resulting in a gradual
reduction  in its value relative to the average wage. In its place, a social assistance program  would
emerge.
Many of the changes reflected the  Government's position that redistribution should be
removed from the pension scheme.  This was based on the desire to tighten the link between
contributions and  benefits in order to  improve compliance and, in  the view  of some of  the
reformers, the  insurance characteristics in  the  system.  The  final  outcome  in  terms  of
intragenerational  redistribution  and fiscal impact of shifting  redistribution  out of the public  pension
scheme  will depend on various factors, such as how pensions  are actually taxed in the future, the
contribution  structure  and the extent  to which social  assistance  replaces  the current redistribution.
The essential difference  between  the multipillar  pension system and the reformed PAYG
scheme  is that the former  includes  a mandatory  second  pillar which replaces a portion of the PAYG
scheme.  Workers who decide to stay in the reformed PAYG will continue having 30 percent of
their gross wages  channeled to the PAYG--the statutory rates  will be  21  percent from the
employer  and 9 percent from the employee. Workers who switch to the new system  will have 22
percent of their gross wages channeled to the PAYG and 8 percent channeled to their second
pillar accounts--the statutory rates will  be 21 percent from the employer  (channeled to the
PAYG), and 9 percent from the employee (of which 1 percent to the PAYG and 8 percent to the
second pillar).  15
Is This  contribution  rate  structure  follows  a two year  transitional  period. For those who switch  to the new
system,  the employee  contribution  to the second  pillar  will be 6 percent  in 1998,  7 percent  in 1999  and 8
percent  from 2000 onward. The  overall  contribution  rate would  remain  unchanged  as employer  rates  are
reduced.
22The first pillar of the multipillar system would apply the same rules as the reformed PAYG,
including higher retirement  age and minimum years  of service  and indexation  arrangements.  The
benefit formula is scaled down in proportion with the size of the contribution rates.  Therefore, a full
career average  income worker  opting for the  new system  could expect  a replacement  ratio  in the
first pillar amounting to about 45 percent of the net average wage, equivalent to an annual accrual
rate of 1.22 percent.1  6 This accrual rate is roughly 74 percent of the 1.65 accrual rate which applies
for those workers who remain in the reformed PAYG  scheme.  This corresponds  to the ratio of the
contribution  rate  to  the  PAYG  paid  by  workers  who  switch  to  the multipillar  scheme  to  the
contribution rate paid by workers who do not switch, namely 22/30.  For those who  switched to the
new  scheme, the  1.22 accrual  rate applied  for both  past  and  future years  of  participation  in the
system,  implying that  anyone  who  switched  would  be  effectively  forfeiting  approximately  one
quarter of their acquired rights in the process.
The mandatory contributions to the second pillar would be placed in pension  funds legally
structured along the lines of the existing third pillar--mutual  benefit funds managed  exclusively by
their  members.  This is a  Hungarian  construction,  differing  from  the trusts  in the  Anglo-Saxon
countries (whose boards either consists of employer appointees,  or have a split representation,  as in
Australia),  or the Swiss foundations  (whose boards contain employer and employee representatives
in equal proportions).  The third pillar funds in Hungary frequently contain representatives  from the
companies or financial institutions  that participated  in the organization of the funds,  but only to the
extent  that they  are also  members  of the  plan.  The  potential  legal  links between  funds  and the
;' sponsoring" institution (through the board members) seem weaker in Hungary than  in Switzerland
or  the  Anglo-Saxon  countries  insofar  as  ensuring  accountability  and  appropriate  incentives for
prudent management.
The concem that the third pillar construction was not sufficiently robust to serve as the basis
for  the  second pillar,  led  the  Government  to  introduce  some  safeguards,  including  mandatory
internal  reserves equal to  at  least  0.5  percent  of  the  stock  of  individual accounts,  a  0.3 percent
16  Workers who became disabled during the accumulation period would have the choice of remaining in
the mixed system or transfering their second pillar balances back to the public scheme.  In the latter case,
23contribution to a Guarantee Fund, and restrictions on internal asset management.  Internal asset
management  would be allowed  only if the pension fund was able to accumulate  an additional  layer
of reserves by  a prescribed date.  Otherwise, pension funds will have to  hire external asset
managers.  Pension funds would be  responsible for the  selection of the  asset manager, the
administration  of the accounts, and for negotiating annuities with insurance companies  for their
members. Funds with at least 25,000 members were allowed  to provide annuities  themselves and
the Supervisor  could allow smaller funds to do so as well if they maintained appropriate  reserves.
Workers would choose their fund and would be allowed to switch one year after the start of the
reform and twice a year thereafter. Workers who participated  in the multipillar  system  but failed to
choose  a pension fund would be assigned  to county level public entities created especially  for this
purpose. However,  they would  still  be allowed to choose  a private  fund later.
The original proposal offered limited guarantees on  second pillar accounts, but  was
modified in reaction to public debates. What emerged were two layers of protection  which may
present  administrative  and supervisory  problems in the future. First, individuals  participating  in the
second  pillar will be entitled  to annuities  which are not less than 25 percent of the value  of the first
pillar pension. This guarantee  is equivalent  to around 93 percent of the pension which would have
been  received if the worker had  remained in the pure PAYG  scheme, and applies to workers with at
least 15 years of participation  in the new system.  Because of the short accumulation  period, the
guarantee could be triggered for workers in their mid-forties who switch to the new scheme,
although the amount required to meet this guarantee should not be significant. Aside from the
creation of a contingent liability,  the use of an individual  guarantee  may add to administrative  costs,
especially  if the guarantee  is frequently  monitored by actuaries.  Also, it is still not clear whether the
newly created Guarantee Fund would have sufficient resources  to cover the implied  liabilities, or
how the behavior  of market  participants  may be affected by the very existence of the guarantee.
In addition, there is a type of relative rate of return guarantee loosely connected  with the
individual  guarantee  which provides  the Supervisory authority  with wide discretion  toward setting
the range of investment  returns  in a given period. In contrast  to the relative rate of return guarantees
they  would  receive  full disability  benefits,  just as someone  who  remained  in  the PAYG  system.
24in  Chile  and  Argentina,  which  are  stated  through  transparent  formulas,  and  attempt  to  protect
individuals  against  poorly  performing  funds  rather  than  general  capital  market  risks, 1 7 the
Hungarian law does not set objective reference points for the performance of the sector.  This design
introduces  an element of uncertainty  in the market  by allowing  a great deal of  discretion  for the
Supervisor. 1  8
Switching Strategies
In the original Government proposal, workers below the  age of 40 would have been forced
to join the mixed system, while  older workers would be have been required to stay in the reformed
PAYG scheme.  As the reform effort progressed, however, it became apparent that a mandatory  cut-
off age would spark a constitutional  battle  over accrued  rights and prove too costly to implement.
These  problems  led the  Government  to make the reform  mandatory  only for new  entrants to the
labor  market  and  voluntary  for  anyone  with a  contribution  history  under  the  old  scheme.  The
Government  decided  early in the  process  to  recognize  accrued  rights by  granting  compensatory
pensions, as in the case of Argentina,  and not by recognition bonds, as in the case of Chile, Peru and
Colombia.
The rights earned under the old scheme would  be recognized  by applying the accrual rates
of the new first pillar.  Obviously, these rates are lower than those implied by the current  formula, a
policy made possible by the voluntary  nature of the switching process.  Younger workers  would still
choose the new scheme, because the compounded returns to second pillar accounts would  result in
higher pensions in the new scheme under reasonable assumptions.  Therefore, the valuation  of past
contributions  in the  context  of a  voluntary  switch allowed  the  Government a  certain  measure  of
control over the speed of the transition  and the size of early transition  deficits, as well  as a reduction
See Iglesias  and Acuna (1992), Superintendency  of AFPs (1996). Vittas and Iglesias  (1992), Vittas (1995
and 1996)  and Rofinan  (1995  and 1996) for descriptions  of guarantees  in the Chilean  and Argentine systems.
At the time of writing,  the Supervisory Agency was considering setting  the reference  return equal to the
average  return of a basket  of long-term Govemment securities, and constructing an asymmetric  band
around  the reference return--a  minimum return 10 percent below the reference return, and a maximum
return 30 percent above the reference return.
25in the implicit debt.  Based on reasonable  assumptions, workers below ages 35-40 would find it
attractive  to switch under the accrued  rights  valuation chosen. Appendix 2 presents a more detailed
examination  of the switching  decision.
The Government  chose  to target  age cohorts younger than its original cut-off age of 40 after
examining  recent experiences in the UK and Argentina. 19 In both cases, the number of workers
opting for the funded scheme was greater than anticipated, suggesting that the incentives were
greater  than necessary. This helped convince  the Government  that a conservative  approach  to the
valuation  of acquire rights was the correct strategy.  By targeting a slightly lower age cohort, the
Govermment  expects to avoid a situation  in which large numbers  of older workers switch  to the new
scheme. At the same time, the Government  recognized  that part of the excess switching,  especially
in the UK, was due to "overselling",  whereby an aggressive sales force convinced some older
workers  to switch  when it may not have  been to their advantage. The UEK  experience  suggested  that
strong supervision  and good public information would be required during the transition.  The
Government is  now  mounting a  public information campaign in  the  months leading up  to
implementation  which includes  local, interactive  computer  terminals  and Internet Web sites,  the first
of which became  accessible  in June 1997.
Transition Strategies
The diversion of an 8 percent contribution  rate from the PAYG to private, second  pillar
accounts,  implies a loss of revenues  for the PAYG scheme. This  revenue loss is likely  to amount  to
.8-1.3  percent of GDP in the early years of the reforn,  depending  on the number  of workers opting
for the new system. This figure would increase over time, due to coverage expansion in the new
system,  and would increase  the public  deficit in the absence  of offsetting measures. The increase  in
the deficit would be roughly equivalent  to the increase in private savings, implying unchanged
national savings, abstracting from interest rate effects or other effects on private savings.  The
'  See  Disney  and Whitehouse  (1992)  and  Whitehouse  (1995)  for an analysis  of the opt-out  experience  in  the
United  Kingdom,  and Rofman  (ibid) for a description  of  the Argentine  experience.  Whitehouse  (1996)
provides  a switching  analysis  for  Hungary.  Holzmann  (1997)  presents  a general  framework.
26reform would be primarily  debt-financed, involving a replacement of explicit for implicit debt.  The
potential  growth  effects  of this  strategy  would  be  very  limited, and  the  burden  of  the transition
would  be  shifted  entirely  to  future  generations  (replicating  the  pattern  of  intergenerational
distribution  of the PAYG).  In addition, the  sharp increase in the  official  public deficit and in the
explicit  public debt  could create complications  for a country already  making  efforts to reduce its
deficits and heavy debt burden -- the total public  deficit has been reduced from more than 8 percent
of GDP to around 4 percent of GDP in the last two years, and the consolidated  public debt in 1997
amounted to 70 percent of GDP. 20
Pure  debt-financing  of  the  transition  was  rejected  by  the  Government,  however,  which
viewed the reform  as an opportunity to  generate  higher national  savings  and  growth rates, and  is
aware that this objective implies more reliance  on tax-financing (or expenditure  reduction).  At the
same time, the  Government  was pressed to  present  a strategy that would  not  imply an excessive
burden  on  few  cohorts.  Whereas  debt-finance  would  imply  transferring  the  burden  to  future
generations, a pure tax-finance strategy would  imply a heavier burden  on the current generation.  A
reform which struck an intergenerational balance was required.
The  pension  reform  package which  was  passed by Parliament  relies  on relatively  more
debt-financing in the  first years of the reform,  followed by relatively more -tax-financing in the next
decade.  This strategy  would be  implemented  through  a  set of reforms  in the  PAYG that would
gradually offset the  deterioration  due  to demographic  trends and  produce  some  surpluses  in the
PAYG (before considering  the effects of the opt out).  These include the  increase in retirement age,
change  in tax  regime and  the change in indexation  rules.  As  shown  in the  next  section, as these
20  It is not clear to what extent financial  markets already factor in public pension liabilities which are not
reported in official statistics, although  it is interesting to note that Hungary's credit rating improved in the
months which followed passage of the pension reform legislation. While there is evidence  that unfunded
pension liabilities are reflected in the market's valuation of private firms,  (Bulow, Morck, and Summers
(1987)) this line of research has not been extended to the public sector. If the market fully recognizes  the
existence of  these  liabilities, the  "transitional  deficit"  should not  affect the  government's cost  of
borrowing. There is growing awareness of the  existence and magnitude of public pension liabilities,
particularly in the context of the recent debate over European Monetary Union.  Recent studies have
quantified  the pension debt for OECD (IMF (1995)), (OECD (1994)) and non-OECD countries (Kane and
Palacios  (1996)).
27policies are implemented, the reform  should produce a gradual increase in national savings over the
next decade.  The distribution of the burden across cohorts would  also be more evenly distributed.
This strategy  resembles hypothetical  simulations  of transitions  with mixed  financing  found  in the
academic literature. 21
Simulating the Fiscal Impact of theAMultipillar  Reform:  The PAYG Reforms
It is useful to present  the simulations  of the reforn  in two  stages.  First, the  impact of  the
various  measures designed to improve the balance of the PAYG  can be progressively assessed,  and
contrasted with the " no reform"  scenario.  Second, the direct fiscal impact of the introduction of the
second pillar  can be examined,  in combination  with reforms  of  the PAYG.  The macroeconomic
assumptions  used are the same as those  described in Table 4 with  the exception of a slightly higher
growth rate of the labor force in the  scenarios which include an increase in the retirement age.
The reforms of the PAYG scheme  include a complex  set of changes to the benefit formula.
One important change  is a  shift from  a net to a gross wage  assessment  base in 2013.  The shift to
gross wages as the base for calculating  new pensions is accompanied  by the  introduction of an EET
tax treatment  where  contributions  and  investment returns on  private  pension  savings  are  exempt
from the personal income tax while  benefits are subject to taxation,  albeit with a tax credit.  Based
on conservative  assumptions regarding  taxation of benefits, the combined  impact of these changes  is
neutral with respect to the average  net pension  in the system.  In other words, these changes  do not
affect the deficits projected in Figure 3a above.
However,  the introduction  of a 25 percent tax credit for employee  contributions, (which  is
meant to approximate  the exemption  provided in an EET environment)  has  an immediate  impact.
The loss in personal  income tax  (PIT)  revenues is roughly  0.4  percent  of GDP every  year.  This
21  Kotlikoff (1995) simulates  a reform involving  full debt-finance  in the first five years of the transition, and
tax-finance  thereafter. Such a strategy would not diminish  the lifetime utility of current cohorts and would
increase the lifetime utility of future cohorts.  It should be noted that the model utilized (the Auerbach-
Kotlikoff model) is a model of exogenous  growth that may underestimate  the growth effects  of the reform,
and the impact of higher growth on the welfare of current and future generations. Corsetti  and Schmidt-
Hebbel  (1995) examine  the possible  growth effects  of a pension  reform under an endogenous  growth model.
28measure  was clearly part of the overall  pension  reform package and would  have led, ceteris  paribus,
to a higher deficit. However,  the loss of approximately  0.4 percent of GDP was absorbed into the
overall budgetary plan and offset with reductions in other public expenditures.  In light of this
policy,  the effect is not incorporated  into  the projection  results.
The changes in the benefit formula  and the tax treatment have little or no impact on the
fiscal situation. In contrast,  the two most important  reform measures,  the increase  in the retirement
age and the shift toward mixed  indexation,  have a major impact as shown in Figure 4 below. The
deficit reduction  generated  by the gradual increase  of the retirement  age is the distance  between  the
bottom and the middle lines (with asterisks). This is due partly to the increase in the statutory
normal and early retirement ages over time and partly to the increase in the number of years
required  to take early retirement. After 2008,  the minimum number  of years required  to retire at age
59 rises to 37, although penalties  are applied.  Meanwhile, retirement  at age 62 without any penalty
is possible only after 40 years of contributions  (or equivalent  credits) in the system.  While it is
difficult to predict retirement behavior  in the face of the new penalties  or the average number of
contribution  years future new pensioners  will have accumulated,  reasonable  assumptions  suggest  an
increase in  the effective retirement  age for men and women of roughly 2 and 5 years respectively.
The longer working period raises pensions  given the positive accrual  rate schedule  but the higher
pension  is received for fewer years and some individuals  continue  to contribute  to the scheme. The
net effect is an average annual reduction  in future deficits of about 1.5  percent of GDP.
While the retirement age increase has an  important impact, it is only when the new
indexation  method is added to the reform package that the balance of the PAYG moves into an
extended  period of surplus. Figure  4 shows  the impact of the original  indexation  proposal in which
pensions  in progress were to be indexed  to an evenly weighted average of price and wage growth
beginning  in 1998.  The top line shows how these surpluses peak in 2013.  After this, the baby
boom cohorts whose retirement was delayed by the last increase in the retirement age begin to
retire. Later, deficits reemerge when a second demographic shock hits the PAYG scheme around
2035.  With an increase in life expectancy  of two years per decade assumed, the retirement  age
increase  to 62 is not sufficient  to offset the demographic developments  and to maintain a constant
29retirement duration in the very long run.  It must be stressed that the savings generated by the
indexation  measure  rely on the growth of real wages.
Figure  4  Deficits  in  Public Pension  Scheme
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The top line in Figure 4 can be interpreted  as the surplus  which would have been created by
the original reform package.  However, as noted earlier, the original Government  proposal was
modified  in several ways which led to a reduction in savings,  especially in the short run.  Figure 5
shows  the effect of the two most costly compromises,  namely, the increase in widow's benefits and
the delay of the indexation  change. Previously,  survivors  (mostly women) who had acquired their
own pensions were not eligible for survivor pensions unless they forfeited their own retirement
pensions. After the reform, survivors would receive would receive 20 percent of their spouse's
pension  in addition  to their own pension. Moreover,  the increase  was retroactively  applied resulting
in a sudden  jump of around  20 percent in the pensions  of most widows.
Even more important  however,  was the compromise  on the indexation of pensions  in 1998-
2000 negotiated between the Government and major interest groups and  slightly modified in
30Parliament.  Rather than the  savings which would have resulted in the  original proposal, the
compromise  indexed 1998  and 1999 pensions  by net wage growth in 1997 and 1998 respectively.
Assuming  that inflation declines as expected,  this backward  indexation  locked in large real pension
increases  in these years.
Figure 5 Deficits in  Public Pension Scheme
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The impact of those two measures  amounts to between  0.5-1.0 percent of GDP during  the
first years of the transition. In present value terms, the reduction  in the implicit pension debt was
about 15 percent of GDP less  than it would  have been if the original  package had been achieved.  It
should be noted that the decision  to was made in response  to pressures  to compensate  for the decline
in real pensions in the two years preceding  the reform, and implies  a large increase (6 percent) in
real average pensions at the beginning of 1998,  just five months before Parliamentary  elections.
The pattern  is reminiscent  of the earlier increase  in 1994  average  pensions  just prior to the last major
elections  (see Table 2 above). In other words,  it is difficult  to assess  the causal relationship  between
31the overall  reformn  package  and the real pension increases  of 1998-1999.  22  Whatever  the case, it is
clear that the political compromises  focused on the very short term and that the discount rate for
political  calculations  was high.
The final PAYG reform measures as shown in Figure 5 provide the starting point for the
analysis of the introduction  of the second pillar.  To this point, the package results in a significant
improvement  in the finances  of the PAYG during  the next decade, followed by a gradual erosion of
the surpluses  at the enid  of the following  decade. The pension system  would record deficits again at
the end of the projection  period,  and the elimination  of these deficits would require further reforms
of the PAYG, such as a further increase in retirement age (say to 65 years as in most OECD
countries) or the adoption of price indexation.  Nevertheless,  the reform measures achieved a
significant  reduction in future deficits and the implicit  pension debt.  In fact, the reforms produced
small  but significant  surpluses.
Despite the presence  of these surpluses,  the Government  never gave serious consideration
to a reform package limited to improving the PAYG scheme,  as it saw four serious shortcoming in
such a solution:  First, the accumulation of surpluses in the PAYG would provide for an easy
opportunity  to reverse  the reforns through politically-motivated  benefit increases. Second, it would
have created a new role for the public pension fund as an asset manager. There was little reason
either from historical Hungarian or international experience  to believe that such an arrangement
would  lead to efficient investment allocation or good corporate  governance.  Third, this solution
was unlikely to contribute  to the type of capital market development which a multipillar package
was capable of generating. Finally, the promise of higher returns in the private scheme, even after
taking into account higher administrative  costs, helped offset the benefit reductions in the PAYG
scheme  and simultaneously  diversified  the workers' risk in  the long-run.  This positive aspect of the
overall  package was instrumental  in generating support,  especially  among younger  voters.  In view
of these and other perceived advantages, the new system was designed to  divert the  savings
22  The indexation  parameters  for 1998 and 1999  were chosen  very deliberately  and were the result of
many  hours of negotiation  including  during  the 13  hour  meeting  of the Interest  Reconciliation  Council  just
prior  to Parliamentary  submission.
32generated by the reform  to a competitive  and privately-managed  pension  funds  referred to as the
second pillar.
Simulating  the Fiscal  Impact of the Multipillar  Reform: Introducing  the Second Pillar
The simulations of the second part of the reform assume that all workers  under age 35 will
voluntarily  choose to divert  part of their contributions  to a privately managed  funded component,
and that workers entering the labor market after mid-1998  will be required to do so.  Conservatively,
it is assumed that from  the 8 percentage point contribution  to the  second pillar, roughly  7 percent
will  remain after  administrative  costs to generate  retirement  income.  The  real  rate  of return  on
second pillar accounts  is assumed  to be  1.5 percent  above  real wage  growth  in the  long run, an
assumption  consistent  with the  performance of private  pension  funds with  balanced  portfolios  in
OECD  countries (Davis (1995)), with actuarial guidelines  for private funds in the US and the UK,
and with the dynamic efficiency  condition.2 3 The 1.5 per cent differential  may actually be too low,
considering the higher returns earned by private pension  funds  in OECD countries  in the  1980s and
the  1  990s and the lower capital/labor ratio in Hungary,  relative to the OECD  average.  The interest
rate used during the annuity period  is equivalent to the  no-risk yield on government  debt which  in
turn  is assumed  to  equal the  growth  rate of  wages.  All  of  these  assumptions,  along  with  the
parameters  of the PAYG  scheme and accrued rights valuation,  are consistent  with a voluntary  opt-
out for workers in their mid-thirties (see Appendix 2).
The analysis of the full reform scenario begins  with an assessment  of the  impact of the opt
out  on the PAYG  balance.  Figure  6 confirms the  obvious  fact that  allowing  workers  to divert
contributions  to the  second pillar  implies an immediate  loss of revenues.  This loss during the first
five years of the reform  is approximately  I percent  of GDP, taking into account that the switching
process would take place gradually throughout 1998.  The PAYG deficit would tend  to increase in
23  The  dynamic  efficiency  condition  is usually  derived  in the absence  of risk (see, e.g., Blanchard  and Fischer
(1992) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin  (1995)), whereas  the return on private funds contain a risk premium.
However, see Feldstein  (1995a and 1995b)  for an analysis of the US case which considers  risk factors. See
also Kocherlakota  (1996) for an analysis  of how much  risk is contained  in  the equity premium.
33the following  years, as the revenue  loss caused by the  gradual expansion  of  coverage in the  new
system increased.  However,  the measures  described  above would  more than  offset the  revenue
losses caused by the opt out, allowing  a reduction in the deficit.  The improvement  continues even
after the onset  of the  first demographic  shock  around 2009,  because of the  final tightening of  the
retirement rules  which occurs in that  year.  The deficits  increase however,  when the large cohorts
whose retirement  is postponed begin to retire in  2013.
Figure 6  Deficits in Public Pension Scheme
Before and After Opt-out, 1996-2050
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The growing  deficits  peak around  2022  and  then fall  significantly  as the  first cohorts  to
receive first pillar benefits in the new system retire (i.e., those aged 35 in 1998). Note also that the
difference between  the PAYG balances  with and without the opt out increases until about the  same
time and narrows  thereafter.  By 2043,  the  PAYG  deficit with the  multipillar  system is actually
smaller than the  PAYG  deficit had the  multipillar  scheme not been  introduced.  These results  are
driven by two factors.  First, the replacement  ratio in the first pillar of the new system is about three
fourths of the  replacement ratio in the reformed PAYG.  Thus, the imbalance  between replacement
34ratios and  contributions  created by  the  opt out starts  to taper off after  the  cohorts  in the  mixed
system begin to retire.  Second, the reform  involves reduction of about  1/4 in the accrued rights of
workers who  opt for the new system.  As a result, the valuation for the years  of contribution under
the old system are lower than what would have been generated by the old benefit formula.
Although  the opt out would  generate deficits in the PAYG, they  would be accompanied by
an  increase  in  flows  to  private  pension  fund  accounts.  As  shown  below  in  Figure  7,  the
accumulated pool of long term savings  would grow very rapidly during the first twenty years  of the
system,  given  that  few  participants  would  become  eligible  for  second  pillar  benefits  and  the
balances would be compounding  over time.  After 2019, however, the rate of growth of the  second
pillar  would  be  tempered  by  the  gradual  outflow  of  annuity  payments.  Nevertheless,  the
accumulation  of  assets  reaches  an  impressive  50  percent  of  GDP  by  the  year  2030,  a  figure
comparable to  Chile and the U.S. today  and  somewhat lower than  the UK  and  Switzerland.  The
new private pension  sector is likely  to play an  important role in developing  financial markets  and
facilitating investment finance, with positive effects on growth24
24  See Levine and Zervos (1996)  for a cross-country analysis  and Holzmann  (1996) f or a an analysis of
the Chilean  case.
35Figure 7 Accumulation of Assets in Hungarian
Private Pension System, 1998-2050
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The  most  important  positive  impact  of the  reform  on  economic  growth,  however,  will
depend on the path of national  savings, as the capital market  effect really becomes  powerful  if it is
combined  with an increase in national  savings.  The increase  in total savings generated  within the
pension  system is obtained combining  the  public and  private  pension  savings flows,  as  shown  in
Figure  8.  In the absence of  other changes  in private  savings  or in the public deficit 5,  national
savings  would increase in line with the  savings generated  in the PAYG, shown  in the  top  line of
Figure  6.  Total  pension savings  would  decline  after  2013,  following  the increase  in the  PAYG
deficits,  but would  increase again  after  2020,  when the  first  cohorts  in the  new  system  begin  to
retire.  The contribution of the pension system to national  savings would decline significantly  at the
end  of the  projection period,  as the  scheme matured,  but returns  on the  stock of  private  pension
assets would make this a gradual process.
25  The Government intends  to offset part of the loss of revenues during the first years of the transition by
transferring  resources  to the PAYG while maintaining the primary surplus constant (at 2 percent of GDP).
To the extent that this occurs,  the transition would be more tax-financed, and the savings from the reform
will be greater than those shown in Figure 9.
36Figure  8  Savings in the Hungarian
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The  final  impact  of  demographic  aging  would  cause  net  pension  savings  to  become
negative  during the  final  decade  of  the  projection  period.  If  long-run  economic  growth  was
increased  by  the  reform  or  rates  of  return  to  the  pension  funds  exceeded  our  conservative
assumptions,  the  pension  system  could  continue  to  generate  savings  throughout  the  period.
However, the decline  in pension savings due to population aging is inevitable  if no further action  is
taken.  One obvious measure, given the projected  increase in life expectancy,  is to further increase
the  retirement  age  to  maintain  the  ratio  of  working  to  retirement  years.  A  shift  to pure  price
indexation  is another  measure  that  would  offset  the  impact  of  aging  and  improve  the  savings
performance.
The ultimate  impact of  the reform  on national  savings would  depend  on the  reaction  of
private savings to some  of the  individual measures  of the  reform, as well  as  on the  initial growth
effects of the reform.  The actuarial model cannot estimate these effects, but it is possible to identify
some of the changes that might occur.  The increase in retirement age could  induce some decline  in
37private savings, whereas  the change in indexation  would imply a decrease in expected retirement
income, inducing some increase in private savings?6 The expectation  of higher returns on the 8
percent contribution  diverted  to the second  pillar could have a positive or negative  effect on private
savings, depending on the relative sizes of the income and substitution effects. The net impact of
these three factors on private  savings is, therefore,  ambiguous, and would in any case be dampened
by the existence of liquidity constraints. On the whole, there is good reason to believe that the
reform package would  increase  national savings  by at least the amounts shown  in the simulations 27
V.  Tentative  Conclusions  and Lessons  for Other Transforming  Economies
Hungary is finalizing preparations for a  comprehensive pension reform, and will soon
become the first Central European country to implement a  multipillar system.  The reform take
place in the context of a disappointing  growth performance. Hungary has registered  modest growth
rates of around 2 percent p.a. since 1993,  whereas the other three Visegrad countries  and Slovenia
have recorded  growth  rates above 4 percent per year during the same period. The main explanation
for this poor performance  probably lies in the fiscal and current account disequilibria  that Hungary
faced at the start of its recovery--around  8 and 9 percent of GDP, respectively,  in 1993  and 1994.
Whereas  the other Visegrad  countries and Slovenia  have been able to consolidate  the recovery of
investment  and output,  Hungary  had to undergo a drastic stabilization  program in 1995 and 1996.
This program was successful  in reducing  the fiscal and current account deficits  to below 4 percent
of GDP, in reducing  the ratio of public debt to GDP (at around 85 percent), and averting a balance
of payments crisis, but also dampened  the output recovery.
Although output growth is expected to recover in 1997, only a sustained savings effort
above current levels (around 20 percent of GDP) can place the Hungarian economy  on a strong
growth trajectory in the medium  term.  The reform being finalized includes  measures  to inprove
the PAYG system as well as the introduction  of a mandatory second pillar.  The PAYG measures
26  For a review  of these  effects,  see Kotlikoff  (1989).
27  If the reform  enhances  growth,  there  could  be some  additional  endogenous  increases  in private  savings
(Serven,  Schmidt-Hebbel  and  Solimano  (1994)).
38include an increase  in the nornal  retirement  age to 62 (up from 60 for men  and 55 for women),  an
increase in the minimum years of service for early retirement, and a change in the indexation regime
(from net wage indexation to a ;Swiss"  formula involving wages and prices with equal weights).  If
fully implemented,  these measures  would  generate  some  increase  in national  savings, foster  the
development of capital markets,  and reduce the  distortions  in labor markets.  These results  would
contribute to an  improvement  in Hungary's  growth  perfornance,  although  it is admittedly  difficult
to quantify their impact? 8
Political compromises  have weakened  the  original reform concept  and  it could be  argued
that  the  Hungarian  reformn  does  not  go  far  enough  in  raising national  savings  and  in reducing
distortionary  payroll  taxes.  Although  these may  be  valid criticisms,  it should  be  noted  that  the
improvement relative  to the no reform scenario  is still very significant--the reform  would succeed in
transforming pension  deficits averaging  around  3 percent of GDP  into pension  surpluses of  more
than  1.5 percent  of GDP  (public and private  balances  combined) by  the  end  of the  next  decade,
while promoting the development of capital markets.  If the increased rate of return to contributions
in second pillar accounts reduced the perceived  tax  for forced retirement  savings, this, along  with
concurrent reductions  in the income and other social insurance taxes (such as contributions to health
care)  could reduce  the  rate  of tax  evasion  and  the  informalization  of  the  economy.  If  growth
performance responds  favorably to the  reform,  and the  real return on  diversified  private pension
funds proves higher than GDP growth--in line with the experience of most  OECD countries--future
pensioners would be  able to enjoy higher real benefits than they would have in the PAYG system.
The simulations  presented  here, which  include  none  of these positive  effects,  may  understate  the
benefits of the reform.
In  order  to  generate  a  greater  increase  in  savings  and  allow  a  greater  reduction  in
contribution rates, the reform would require more budgetary support and more efforts to replace  the
28  Sachs  and Werner (1996)  utilize  an endogenous  growth framework  to argue that the adoption  of multipillar
systems  would help Central European countries converge more rapidly to the income levels of Western
Europe,  but do not provide  direct  estimates  of this factor. Levine  and Zervos  (ibid) provide evidence  that long
run growth is positively affected by capital market liquidity, but it is difficult to establish a quantitative
relation  between  pension reform  and capital  market liquidity.
39payroll tax with other taxes. The Government has recently indicated that it will offset transitional
pension  deficits to the extent  necessary to maintain  its path toward  meeting EU accession  criteria. If
this decision is effectivelly  implemented, it will imply more tax financing of the transition and a
greater increase in national savings in the early stages of the reform.  Further efforts that would
allow a reduction in contribution rates have been rejected for the moment, however. A straight
switch from wage to price indexation has been ruled out of the moment and the recourse to other
taxes also seems difficult, as rates are high across the spectrum of taxes (e.g., VAT rates of 25
percent and a top personal income tax rate of 42 percent), and efforts are already being made to
broaden tax bases and reduce  tax rates.
Another  constraint  relates  to the social  objectives  of the reform and the impact  of reforms to
the public scheme. While intergenerational  smoothing  can be achieved to a certain extent through
mixed tax and debt-financing  strategies, intragenerational  redistribution presents a more complex
policy challenge  and is beyond the scope of this paper. In order for the reform package  as a whole
to have a neutral impact  across income groups,  the new first pillar of the mixed system  would need
to be more redistributive  than the old scheme, since  the second pillar minimizes  redistribution. The
Hungarian reformers opted instead to reduce the redistributive components in both the old PAYG
scheme and the new first pillar of the multipillar  scheme.  As a result, most of intragenerational
redistribution will be provided by a means-tested  minimum income guarantee under a new social
assistance  program.
The Hungarian decision to  shift intragenerational redistribution outside tlr  traditional
PAYG scheme but to retain a significant role for the public pension scheme effectively  resulted in a
four-pillar system: a "zero"  pillar consisting of a  means-tested income guarantee for the old,
financed  from general  taxes;  a first pillar, consisting  of an earnings-related  PAYG,  financed entirely
from contributions; a second pillar, mandatory, private and fully-funded; and a voluntary pillar.
When compared to other multipillar systems around the world (e.g., Argentina,  Australia, Chile,
Switzerland), this construction is unique in its reliance on an earnings-related  PAYG scheme to
smooth lifetime consumption  for workers' with relatively  high incomes.
40The decision to eliminate the redistributive  formula within the pension  system was driven
by the reformers'  desire to reverse the decline  in the covered wage bill which  was responsible  for
the majority of the deterioration  in pension  finances  during the early 1990s.  Government  officials
believed  that evasion  and  underreporting  of  earnings  were  linked to the  public  perception  of  an
arbitrary relationship  between  contribution payments  and benefits.  The shift from the net to gross
wage  formula  and  the  elimination  of  the  degressive  benefit  formula  which  provided  lower
replacement rates to higher income workers were  measures intended to restore the credibility of the
insurance principle in the scheme and thereby discourage the growth of the informal sector.
Arguably, the  elimination of  intragenerational  redistribution and  the  creation  of  a  strong
link  between  benefits  and  contributions  could  have  been  achieved  through  the  complete
privatization  of  the  earnings-related  portion  of  the  system.  This  option  was  never  seriously
contemplated,  however,  and  the  decision  to  retain  a  dominant  PAYG  component  in  the  new
Hungarian system (almost 3/4 of the total contribution)  reflected at least three themes in the pension
reform debate.  First,  was the concern that  greater  reliance on a private, fully-funded  component
would  imply  excessive  exposure  of  workers  and  pensioners  to  capital  market  risk.  A  second
influential argument  was  related  to the  question  of  the  transition deficit.  The  concern  was that
accounting language involved in converting  what was previously implicit  pension  obligations  into
explicit ones could lead to confusion and even a negative reaction in the financial  markets.  Finally,
there was the recurrent  claim that the  sense of  solidarity between generations  would be  lost if the
PAYG scheme was eliminated or relegated to a simple redistributive role.
The final reform  was shaped by these and other concerns which are  likely to transcend the
Hungarian context and apply to other countries with similar initial conditions.  The Hungarian  case
illustrates, however, that a multipillar transition  can be designed in the context of an existing mature
PAYG  scheme with  a  large implicit  pension  debt.  In fact,  anecdotal  evidence  suggests that the
reforms  of  the  PAYG  scheme  may  be  more  palatable  if  introduced  in the  context  of  a  more
comprehensive reform package including the introduction of a second pillar.
41In Central Europe,  Croatia,  Poland and Slovenia  are also considering fundamental  pension
reform.  These countries are also making efforts  to catch up with Western Europe,  while facing
adverse demographic  trends  and pressures in their pension systems. Payroll  tax rates are very high,
albeit lower than Hungary's,  and pension expenditures  are also large (more than 14 percent of GDP
in Poland and Slovenia). Passage  of the Hungarian  pension reform by Parliament  has demonstrated
the political and economic  feasibility  of this type of reforn  in Central Europe. The other countries
enjoy a more favorable  macroeconomic  situation  than Hungary, including lower fiscal deficits and
lower marginal rates of taxation across the tax spectrum. For this reason, they should face fewer
constraints  in designing  a pension  reform of the type that Hungary  is implementing. However,  these
advantages  could be short-lived,  if the situation is allowed to deteriorate, pushing  payroll taxes and
deficits higher and leading  to the problems of evasion  that Hungary faces today. A pension reform
which reduces spending in the PAYG scheme and introduces a second pillar could allow these
countries to address the aging problem  while accelerating  growth, enabling them to converge more
quickly to Western  European  income levels.
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46Annex 1:  Description  of the Hungarian Pension  Reform  Model29
I.  Background
The  Hungarian  Pension  Reform  Model  (HPRM)  is  an  Excel-based  program.  Unlike
typical  spreadsheet  models,  the  HPRM  does  not  rely  upon  cell-based  formulas  to  perform
mathematical  and  actuarial  calculations.  Instead,  the  model's  calculations  are performed  using
the Visual  Basic  (a programming  language)  component  of Excel.  The spreadsheet  pages of the
model are used solely for storing input and output.  When the model  is executed,  the Visual Basic
computer  program  reads the  data stored  in the model's  input  spreadsheets,  performs  a series  of
calculations,  and then prints the results to the model's  output spreadsheets.
One  of the  additional  features  of  the  HPRM  is a partially  integrated  individual lifepath
model.  This model  allows the user to estimate  the impact of the reform  on individuals  depending
on age,  gender,  career  path, unemployment  history,  income  level  and  mortality  expectations,  in
addition  to  the  macroeconomic  assumptions  which  impact  both  individuals  and  the  overall
finances  of the  system.  The lifepath model  was  extended,  translated  and  repackaged  by Attila
Kassai at the Hungarian  Ministry of Finance.  The improved  version  is user-friendly  and leads an
individual  worker  through  the simulation,  prompting  him  or her  to input  his wage  history,  age
and other relevant  questions.  A prototype  of this  model can now  be found  on the Intemet  (only
in Hungarian)  at www.meh_hu/pm/nyugd~i/elet.html.
The model consists of two main components:  1) a pension  fund projection module, which  is
used to  project  the  revenues and  the  expenditures  of  both the  PAYG  system  and the  proposed
private pillar,  and  2)  an  individual  module,  which  is used  among  other  things,  to  estimate  the
fraction of the workforce that will join the mixed system in 1998.  The second module has also been
used to estimate  the future pension  of  different  types  of individuals.  The first  module estimates
fiscal impacts and is driven by averages.  For example, to calculate  an entry pension, the aggregate
module uses the wage history of an average  individual.
H.  The Fiscal or Aggregate Module
The aggregate  module  consists  of three  main  components:  1) a  demographic  projection
subroutine,  2) an expenditure projection subroutine, and 3) a revenue projection subroutine.  These
three components are positioned within a " year loop" which cycles from the baseline year to a user-
designated final year.
29  The model was created during 1996 by J. Patrick Wiese, Actuarial Solutions Ltd, based on an original
version by Rita Ban, a Hungarian  actuary working for the Pension Reform Working Group. Please send
further inquiries to JPWiese@aol.com.
47Demographic  Subroutine
When the aggregate module is executed, the demographic subroutine reads data which
describes the demographics  of present-day  Hungary.  These data include  population counts by age
and sex, mortality  rates by age and sex, and fertility  rates by age.
During each cycle of the year loop, the model  reads user-inputted  assumptions that are used
to adjust the mortality  rates and fertility  rates from  their present-day  levels  to estimated future levels.
For example, the present-day  total fertility  rate in Hungary is about 1.5. If the user enters a TFR
of 2.0 for the year 2015, then the model will calculate births for the year 2015 by adjusting the
present-day age-specific fertility rates upwards by  33  percent (2.0/1.5).  After adjusting the
mortality and fertility rates, the rates are applied to the population projected  for the previous year,
thereby generating  a population  estimate,  for each  age and sex, for the current  year in the projection
cycle.
Alternatively,  it is possible to project the population externally (outside of the model) and
import the projected  population  counts into one of the model's input files.  To use this method,  the
user-simply  flips a toggle switch,  which instructs  the model to read the population  count file instead
of using  the projection  process described  above.
Expenditure  Subroutine
Before the projection process begins,  the expenditure subroutine  reads data that describes
the present-day state of the pension system.  This data includes the number of pensioners and
average pensions by age, sex, and type of pension; the benefit formulas  used to calculate entry
pensions, and the retirement criteria (eligibility  requirements based on age and length of service).
The counts of pensioners (by age,  sex, and type of pension) are divided by  age/sex specific
population data, generating  "prevalence rates", which indicate the fraction of people at a particular
age and sex who receive a particular type of pension. This data is used as the starting point from
which the expenditure  projection  process is launched.
During each cycle of the year  loop, the  expenditure subroutine is executed after the
demographic subroutine  has completed  the population  projection.  The expenditure  subroutine then
performs  the following  sequence  of steps:
a.  The prevalence  rates for the stock of pensions  in the prior year are advanced. For example, if in
year "x"  the prevalence rate for old age pensions for men aged 60 is 70 percent, this rate is
moved  forward  to age 61 in year "x-  +1".
b.  The entry rate for new pension awards  is computed  for each age, sex, and type of pension.  An
entry rate is defined as the number  of new pensioners divided by the population.  Continuing
the example above for the cohort at age 61, the model might calculate an entry rate for this
cohort of 15 percent.  Therefore,  the fraction of the cohort receiving  old age pensions would
48increase from  70 percent  (the rate in the prior  year), to 85 percent  (the stock rate in the  prior
year plus the entry rate in the current year).
c.  Pensions awarded in prior years are indexed.  In our example, if the cohort of 60-year-olds in
year  "x"  received an  average pension  of  100 units, and if the  indexation  percentage  were  5
percent, the average pension for this cohort in year"x+l"  would be 105 units (100 increased by
5 percent).
d.  Pensions for new pensioners  are calculated  using benefit formulas.  In  our  example, the  15
percent flow of new pensioners might  receive  an average entry pension  of  110 units  based on
their length of service, wage history, and the benefit formula.
e.  For each  age,  sex, and  type of pension,  a  new average pension  is calculated  by merging  the
average  pension  of  the  stock  of  pensioners  with  the  average  pension  of  the  flow  of  new
pensioners.  In  our example, the new average  pension would equal  105.9 units  (70/85 *  105
units plus 15/85 * 1  10 units)
f.  Finally, for each age, sex, and type of pension, expenditures are calculated  by multiplying the
average  pension by the prevalence  rate by the population.  In our  example,  the expenditures
would  equal  105.9 units  (the average  pension)  multiplied  by  85 percent  (the portion  of  the
cohort receiving  an old  age pension), multiplied  by the population of  men  of age 61.  Total
expenditures are calculated by summing together the expenditures of all cohorts.
This projection process could be described  as a flow system.  Pensioners  are tracked from
entry (award) to exit (death).  When an entry occurs, a benefit formula is executed, and a pension is
awarded based on this formula.  After the initial  award, the pension is indexed in each subsequent
year.  This  is the  only reliable  method  for  simulating  the  impact  of indexation  and  changes  in
benefit formulas.
The challenge  in implementing this method  lies in predicting the entry  rates and the entry
pensions.  In the Hungary model, the method used to calculate entry rates varies by benefit.
For the old age benefit, entry rates are calculated by comparing a projected  length of service
distribution with the retirement  criteria.  The length  of service distribution  can be projected using
any of three different methods, controlled by a toggle  switch.  The service distribution  can be tied to
historical  economic  activity  rates,  or  severed  from  economic  activity  and  defined  strictly  as  a
function of age.
For survivor benefits, entry rates are based on mortality rates and marriage rates.  There are
basically two situations in which  a survivor pension  can be awarded in Hungary's  pension system.
In the first case, a pensioner dies, leaving,  behind  a spouse who lacks an own-right  pension.  In this
case, the spouse  is automatically  entitled to a survivor's  pension.  In the  second case, a pensioner
dies, leaving  behind  a spouse  who  is already  receiving  an  own-right  pension.  In  this case,  the
spouse may  or may not be eligible for a survivor's  pension.  Because  these  situations differ with
respect to their impact on the pension system, the model uses a different entry rate projection system
for each.
49For disability benefits, entry  rates are based on  the  present-day observed entry rates
obtained from recent data.  During the projection  cycle, these rates are adjusted to account for
anticipated  changes in the disability  program.  For example, the baseline scenario assumes a slight
decrease  in the rate of new disability  claims over the next fifteen years.
The Revenue Subroutine
During each year in the projection cycle, after the model has run the demographic  and the
expenditure subroutines,  the revenue subroutine is executed.  To calculate revenues, the model
executes  the following  equation for each age and sex: revenue = working age population * labor-
force  participation  rate * (1-unemployment  rate) * wage * tax rate.  The working  age population is
calculated  in the demographic  subroutine.  The working age population,  the labor force rate, and
the unemployment  rate are sex-specific,  and the wage is age/sex specific.
Projecting the work force near the retirement age is a complex task.  The labor force
participation  rate of age groups near the retirement  age is heavily influenced  by the structure of the
retirement  system.  Current  data for Hungary  reveals  that Hungarians  tend to retire as soon as they
have met the retirement eligibility  criteria.  For this reason, labor force participation  rates near the
retirement age are, in essence, a function of the eligibility criteria of the retirement system.  To
model  this relationship  for cohorts approaching retirement  age, the model modifies  the equation in
the preceding paragraph  by applying  the participation  rates to the non-beneficiary  population,  rather
than the total population count of a cohort.  This allows the model to automatically  estimate the
change  in the labor force induced  by a retirement  age increase. Without  this feature, the user would
be forced to manually  adjust the labor force participation  rates when modeling  a retirement increase,
which  would be a rather  awkward  approach.
The model  does not attempt  to show the impact  of increasing  the effective  retirement age on
unemployment rates.  Such an analysis is complex since  it is clear that there is  not perfect
substitutability  between  older and younger workers and that lower deficits and greater participation
of experienced workers would have beneficial, if indirect effects on the labor market.  The most
acceptable  approach would be to consider several intermediate outcomes  and test the sensitivity of
the results.
Modeling  A Multi-Pillar  System
The model  can be used to project the operation  of either a  pure PAYG system, in which all
revenues  are channelled  into the PAYG system (and all benefits are PAYG or debt financed), or a
multi-pillar  system, in which the PAYG benefits are reduced and a portion of the contributions are
diverted  to private pension  accounts  used to finance  " second pillar" pensions.
When running in multi-pillar mode, the user must specify an implementation  year for the
new system, and the user must also fill out an " opt-out  matrix"'.  In Hungary,  the implementation
year for the new system is tentatively set for 1998, so this is the year used during the runs by
50Hungarian officials.  During  this year, Hungarian  workers will have the option of either  joining the
new system or remaining  in the old system.  It is expected  that most young  workers will opt for the
new system, and most older  workers will remain in the old system.  In the opt-out matrix, the user
can enter his/her estimates of the percentage of each age/sex cohort expected to enter the new
system.  Note that this matrix can also be used to model  a mandatory switch  to a new system.  For
example,  to model a mandatory  switch  for all workers  under the age of 40, the user would enter 100
percent in each age/sex  cell for ages less than 40.
When the aggregate  module is executed  in multi-pillar  mode, the PAYG system is projected
as described in the preceding  paragraphs until the projection  cycle reaches  the implementation  year
for the new system.  At this point, the model splits the universe of workers into two pieces: those
expected to  join the new system, and those expected  to remain in the old.  This split is based on the
user-specified  opt-out  matrix.
For members of the new system, a portion of the contributions are diverted into second
pillar accounts.  In the model, these accounts  are age/sex specific, i.e. each age/sex cohort has its
own  account,  which  contains the  contributions and  the  interest earned  by  that  cohort.
Administrative  costs  for each account  are also  taken into consideration  explicitly.
When members of the new system begin to retire, the model activates  a new set of PAYG
benefit formulas.  These formulas are first pillar formulas,  and are not as generous as the" single-
pillar" benefit formulas applied to retirees from the old  system.  These formnulas  are used to
calculate  the first pillar PAYG  entry pensions. The model also calculates  the second pillar privately
financed  entry pension  for each person retiring from the new system.  This calculation  is performed
using actuarial mathematics.  The model expresses  each age/sex cohort's retirement account on a
per retiree basis, and then converts this sum into an annuity using projected interest rates and
mortality  rates.
IV.  The Individual Model
As described  in section  III, the HPRM consists  of two main modules, an aggregate  module
and an individual module. The individual module complements the aggregate.  The individual
model's  main function is to  project the single-pillar  pension and the multi-pillar pension that
particular types of Hungarian  workers can expect if they either remain in the current system  or join
the new system.  Given a particular set of economic  assumptions, second  pillar contribution rates,
second  pillar administrative  costs, and PAYG benefit  formulas, the individual  module can be used
to estimate  answers  to the following  questions:
a.  What fraction of the working  age population  will switch  to the new the system?
b.  Will the switching  decision  be sensitive  to income-level,  sex, and years of service?
c.  What is the "  cutoff' age at which it makes more sense to join the new system?  Does this age
vary by sex?
51d.  What  replacement  rates  will  be generated  by  the new system?  If the expected  replacement  rate
in the new  system  is high for  today's  young  workers,  can  the first pillar  benefit  PAYG  benefit
formula  be reduced  in order  to generate  future  savings  in the  PAYG  system?
The  individual  module  and the aggregate  module  share  the  same  sets of inputs. They  both
read  the  same  economic  and  demographic  assumptions.  They  both  read  the same  benefit  formulas
and second  pillar  administrative  costs. For this reason,  the results  of the individual  module  are in
harmony  with  those  generated  by the  aggregate.
The  results  of the individual  module  can be fed into  the aggregate  module's  opt-out  matrix.
After  using  the  individual  module  to analyze  the switching  decision  , the user can  develop  a good
sense  for  the switching  decision  process. He can  then  enter  a set of opt-out  rates  in the aggregate
module,  which  are used by the aggregate  module  to split the universe  of workers  into  a segment
expected  to join  the new system,  and a segment  expected  to remain  in the old system.  Of course,  in
a voluntary  framework,  the  outcome  cannot  be perfectly  anticipated.
52Annex  2: Analysis of the Opt-Out  or Switching  Decision
The  Government  originally  considered  implementing  the  pension  reform  through  the
introduction  of a mandatory cut-off age of 40 years.  The switching  or opt-out analysis  suggested,
however, that  a voluntary opt-out was likely avoid  legal problems  and  reduce the implicit pension
debt and transition deficits.  This analysis is described below.
General  Switching  Analysis
Other things constant, younger workers  stand to gain when they  are allowed to divert their
contributions  from a defined benefit to a defined  contribution pension.  This is due to the nature of
the  defined  benefit  scheme  which  provides  a  higher implicit  rate  of  return  to  contributions  to
workers  approaching  retirement  than to younger  workers even where  there is immediate vesting.
For one contribution,  a young worker in a DB scheme accrues the same right as an older worker  yet
the present  value of the marginal  benefit  is much  smaller for the  younger worker.  Conversely,  a
contribution  from a younger worker to a DC scheme will have a much  greater impact on the future
pension  benefit,  as  it grows  with  compound  interest, than  in the  case  of  an  older worker.  The
advantage  of  the DC over the  DB  scheme  for a younger worker  increases  geometrically  by  age
because of this compounding effect.
This effect may be magnified during  a multipillar reform  if the risk adjusted rate  of return
anticipated in the alternative DC scheme is higher than the implicit return in the public DB scheme.
This condition will often hold in a mature PAYG environment when the rate of return is constrained
by the growth  in the wage bill.  In this case, the  incentive for younger  workers will be greater, the
greater the advantage of the net rate of return to private investment over the growth of the wage bill.
While both theory and empirical evidence suggest that the rate of return to capital should be
greater than the implicit return on PAYG, there is not much evidence regarding the relative riskiness
of  the  two  alternatives.  Volatility  in the  funded  scheme  will  depend  on  the  riskiness  of  the
investment choices which are allowed in the  second pillar regime  as well as any guarantees  which
may  be  operative.  (Some  guarantees,  such  as  a  relative  rate  of  return  guarantee,  would  limit
volatility  across pension funds rather than for the sector as a whole.)  On the other hand, the PAYG
promise may also be correctly perceived as being susceptible to a range  of political/fiscal  pressures
especially  in PAYG schemes which  are clearly  not sustainable in the  long run.  In short, it is very
difficult  to  assess  the  relative  riskiness  of  public  and  private  sector  pension  provision.  The
switching process  itself is likely to provide evidence of the perceived  political risk inherent  in the
public PAYG system.
53International Experience
The implication  of the last section is that age should be an important determinant in the
switching  process. Indeed, the outcome in countries which have allowed such a voluntary switch
has reflected this age-specific  effect. In the UK experience of the late 1980s,  for example, Disney
and Whitehouse  (1992)  find that the age factor  dominates under many assumptions regarding  rate of
return, administrative  costs and other factors. Figure A. 1 below illustrates  the tendency of younger
workers to switch  disproportionately. Males are also more likely to switch  to the funded, private
alternative.
Figure  A.1  Persons  Opting  into Funded  System
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Throughout  Latin America the age effect has also driven younger workers to switch in
greater  numbers. This  was true for Chile when  the scheme was introduced  and more recently in the
cases of Argentina,  Peru and Uruguay. The age distribution of optants in Argentina is illustrated
below in Figure A.2.  Another ex-post analysis by Rofinan (1996) found that under reasonable
assumptions, persons under age 40-45 at the time of the reform could expect to  benefit from
participation in the funded pillar.  The fact that even older workers switched, albeit in smaller
numbers,  suggests  that other factors were at work. These factors might  include very low credibility
of the PAYG scheme  or inflated  expectations  of high retums in the second  pillar. Unfortunately,  it is
clear that there were also cases in which older workers were convinced  to switch by unscrupulous
salespersons  in what is known in the UK as overselling.
54Figure A.2  Males Opting into Mixed
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The Switching Analysis  in Hungary
As  described in Annex  1, a second model was developed which  allowed the  user to focus
on  specific  types  of  individual  workers  and  how  they  would  be  affected  by  the  reform.  The
individual model used the same macroeconomic  and demographic  assumptions  as the  fiscal model.
This model  allowed policymakers to generate results according to income level, gender, labor force
participation,  age and  other  relevant  factors.  The model was  also  able to  compare  the  pension
outcomes  for the same individual in the mixed scheme and in the modernized  PAYG scheme.  This
information  was useful to policymakers,  not only in order to anticipate  the speed of the transition,
but also to inform individual workers who would be making the decision.
In  addition to the macroeconomic  assumptions, the user must  input a starting  and ending
wage which  is used to generate  an  age-earnings  profile.  Next,  the  age of the worker  in  1998 is
entered  along  with  his estimated  past  and  projected  future years  of  participation  in the  pension
system.  For the first pillar, the full reform scenario (retirement age, indexation changes etc.)  is used
and an expected retirement age must be entered which corresponds with the retirement age law.  For
the second  pillar, an assumption regarding the administrative costs  either as a percentage  of assets,
contributions  or  both  is made  (not  entered  by  individual users).  The  assumed  rate  of  return  is
expressed relative to wage growth is entered by the user but a default rate is available. The assumed
return on reserves during the annuity stage is fixed in the model.  Finally, the mortality tables to be
considered  in  the  annuity  calculation  are  fixed  and  correspond  to  those  used  to  produce  the
aggregate simulations.  For the baseline case, Annex Table I summarizes  the main assumptions.
55Table A.1 Switching  Model, Baseline  Assumptions
Parameter  Assumption
Starting/Ending  Wage  as % of Average Wage  Men-80/120,  Women-701100
Real 2nd  Pillar Return  Relative  Wage  growth plus 1.5%
Real Return  on Annuity  Reserves  Equivalent  to wage growth
Mortality  Tables Used  to Calculate  Annuity  Unisex;  Actual Projected  Tables
Taxation  PIT levied  on benefits paid out
Administrative  Costs  15 % of contributions
Age of Retirement  61
The model  calculates the old age pension  which is generated  by the new formula for either
the modernized  (1.65 percent accrual rate on gross wages) or the new first pillar (1.22 percent
accrual  rate on gross wages) of the mixed system  as well as the annuity  which can be expected  from
the second  pillar. The result is expressed  as an entry replacement  rate which is indexed in the same
way as the PAYG  scheme.  In the baseline case, the indexation method for all pension benefits is
half price and  half wage growth.  This allows  us to compare entry  pension replacement  rates since  all
three pensions  (modernized,  first pillar and second  pillar) will behave in the same way after the first
year. All pension  benefits are taxed at today's PIT rates with the relevant  brackets indexed  to wage
growth.
The assumptions  are generally conservative. Current administrative  costs in  the voluntary
third pillar are less than 10 percent of contributions,  thus significantly  lower than the assumed 15
percent of contributions  for the second pillar.  While there will be some upwards pressure on
administrative  costs  because of guarantees  and new requirements  to provide  information,  economies
of scale are likely  to reduce expenditures  per participant as the system  expands and the average  fund
size becomes  larger.
Applying  projected mortality tables is consistent with the fiscal projectiors. However, if
life expectancy  does not rise as fast as assumed,  annuities from the second  pillar would be larger.
The use of unisex  tables is consistent  with the planned legislation. It raises annuities for women at
the expense of men, a bias also found  in the PAYG scheme.
Finally, the assumed rate of return differential is conservative,  taking into account the
experience of OECD countries over the last few decades.  Even this conservative differential
assumes, however,  that investment restrictions  will not be overbearing  in the medium term, so that
portfolios of the pension funds will be balanced between government  bonds and higher yielding
instruments  including  equities.
The results of this simulation  exercise  is shown below in Annex Figure A.3, which shows
the entry replacement  rates for individual  cohorts ages 18 to 50.  The top line shows the projected
path of the PAYG replacement rate in the modernized or reformed PAYG system.  The gradual
56decline reflects various factors, including the  shift to the gross wage based formula and  the
extension  of the assessment  period to a lifetime  wage history. The same factors affect the new first
pillar which is shown  by the shaded  portion on the bottom part of the graph.  The area above the
new first pillar line shows  a growing  entry replacement  rate provided  by the second  pillar. The sum
of the two areas is the replacement  rate from the mixed system. In this scenario  then, the mixed
system  becomes attractive for workers in their low 30s.  The maximum accumulation period is
reached  for the youngest  workers,  so that the long-rmn  replacement  rate stabilizes at slightly more
than  65 percent of net wages  with almost one third of this generated  in the second  pillar.
Figure  A.3  Switching  Decision for Average
Hungarian  Worker  by Age in  1998
70%
65.%  --------- ----------------------
60.%
C;c  SS.% - I  I  New  Second Pillar
i  e:~~~~~~~w  New  First Pillar
J'  50.% -Modernized
40.
0A7  0  6  ~  00  0  ~  t  '0  X0  0  C  ts  0r  x
=-  Ce  (  N  (N  r(N  ci  ,  (  t  m
Age in 1998
The calculation of the new first pillar replacement  rate for workers already in the labor
force  requires further explanation.  The calculation  of the new first pillar benefit is based on a linear
accrual  rate of 1.22 percent per year multiplied by the average  gross wage and subject  to personal
income  taxation. In terms of net wage, the accrual rate is equivalent  to about 1 percent per year.
This straightforward  calculation  also applies for a worker who is 30 years old and has 10 years of
contribution  history in 1998  despite  the fact  that the accrual  rate  in the scheme to which  he had been
contributing  was much higher, approximately  1.8 percent per year. If the Government  had forced
workers  to switch to the new scheme, it is likely that at least some workers would  have demanded
the higher statutory  accrual  rate. Indeed, the possibility  of intervention  by the Constitutional  Court
was anticipated for the forced switch and there were many relevant precedents over the last few
years.  The use of a voluntary opt-out arrangement not only avoided these legal problems, but
probably  resulted in fiscal savings  equivalent  to approximately  1/4 of the accrued rights of workers
under  age 40, a significant  reduction  in the implicit  pension  debt (IPD).
57Another result of this calibration is that if more older  workers switch,  the IPD is reduced
even further as workers  forfeit increasing amounts  of past rights. This would  occur, for example, if
workers had more  optimistic  expectations  regarding  the returns  to the second  pillar. Figure A.4 tests
the  sensitivity of the results  to  alternative assumptions about the  rate of return  during the
accumulation  period.  In the "optimistic" scenario, a two percent differential  between  gross returns
and wage growth raises the switching age by about three years to 35.  Of course, if workers are
pessimistic in this regard and expect the rate of return to be equal to wage growth, only workers
below age 27 would  be interested  in switching.
As mentioned  earlier, the relative riskiness  of the two pillars is more  difficult to anticipate.
If the public DB promise lacks credibility,  this will result in a higher switching  age for a given
expectation  about the rate of return in the second  pillar.  If workers distrust the private sector, they
might accept a lower pension from the public scheme which they consider secure. Confidence in
the second  pillar, however,  may increase  as a result of the system's guarantees.
Figure A.4  Switching Decision for Average
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Finally,  it should  be noted that the Government  could have reduced  the pension debt further
by lowering accrual  rates in either the new first pillar or in the compensatory  pensions for workers
with past rights. This could have been done by reducing the first pillar accrual rate or the accrual
rate used to compensate  past years of contribution  to say, 1.1 rather than 1.22  percent. This would
have resulted in the stabilization  of replacement  rates for cohorts aged 34 and below in the baseline
scenario.  Instead, the youngest workers are able to take advantage of the second pillar and get
higher replacement  rates  than those in their early thirties.
58The decision  not to reduce the first pillar or the accrued rights further  stemmed from three
related concerns. First,  the Government  was sensitive  to the need  to maintain  the target replacement
rates even under pessimistic  conditions,  and decided not to attempt to appropriate  this difference.
Second, the Government  also feared that reducing  accrued rights beyond  the proposed levels would
tend to diminish  the base of support  to the reform. Finally,  the Government  wanted to avoid making
the new scheme  voluntary for new entrants. Arguments in favor of voluntarism  would have been
strengthened  by less  robust  results for younger  workers.
Conclusion
This analysis shows  that  the Government  chose a  set of  first pillar accrual factors  and  a
valuation of acquired  rights which would,  under reasonable assumptions,  lead only younger workers
to  switch.  The compound  interest  rate  effect  in  the  second  pillar  makes the  mixed  system  a
progressively  less attractive proposition  above the age of 40.  In this way, the Government  hopes to
avoid  early  transition  deficits  and  allow  time  for  the  expenditure  reductions  in the  modernized
scheme  to  begin  to  cover  part  of  the  public  deficits  caused  by  the  diversion  of  the  8  percent
contribution.
If current workers switch voluntarily, the  IPD will be reduced to some extent  because they
will have forfeited some of their acquired  rights under the old system.  Age-specific  compensation
for  acquired  rights  could  have  been  used  to  reduce  the  IPD  further,  but  was  rejected.  The
Government  also chose to  set  a  new first  pillar  accrual  rate  at a  level  which, under  reasonable
assumptions,  will lead to replacement  rates which  are higher than the current targets.  Again, this
decision  represented  a missed  opportunity to reduce  the  IPD  further, but proved  instrumental  in
building  greater support to the  reform, and in avoiding  a voluntary  scheme for new entrants or an
alternative forrn of guarantees.
Finally, it should be  noted that the Government  intends to stage an extensive  information
campaign which will allow workers to become fully  informed about their decision to opt out or stay
in the  current  scheme.  In  this  way,  the  Government  will  affect the  outcome  of  the  switching
decision  and avoid much  of  the  second guessing  which  might  othenvise  occur.  In  addition,  the
public awareness of the new scheme and the new active role of the individual in his own retirement
planning may have an impact beyond the pension system itself.
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After discussing  the  evolution of the policy dialogue in Hungary,
the paper broadly describes  the reform of the pay-as-you-go
public pension  system  and its partial privatization as legislated
in July 1997.  Through  a combination of a debt and tax financed
transition, the first partial pension privatization in Central
Europe  is shown to generate  increased  national savings  while
placing the pension  system  on a more sustainable  course. The
potential positive impact on savings  was diminished by
politically-motivated  compromises.  Outstanding  issues  include
problematic  features  of the "second  pillar" and the reemergence
of pay-as-you-go  deficits in the long run. This suggests  that
further reforms,  such as  raising  the retirement age beyond 62,
will  eventually be required.
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